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Abstract. Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are important whenever com-
puter technology interfaces with the physical world as it does in self-
driving cars or aircraft control support systems. Due to their many sub-
tleties, controllers for cyber-physical systems deserve to be held to the
highest correctness standards. Their correct functioning is crucial, which
explains the broad interest in safety analysis technology for their math-
ematical models, which are called hybrid systems because they combine
discrete dynamics with continuous dynamics. Differential dynamic logic
(dL) provides logical specification and rigorous reasoning techniques for
hybrid systems. The logic dL is implemented in the theorem prover
KeYmaera X, which has been instrumental in verifying ground robot
controllers, railway systems, and the next-generation airborne collision
avoidance system ACAS X. This article provides an informal overview of
this logical approach to CPS safety that is detailed in a recent textbook
on Logical Foundations of Cyber-Physical Systems. It also explains how
safety guarantees obtained in the land of verified models reach the level
of CPS execution unharmed.
Keywords. Cyber-physical systems and Differential dynamic logic and Hybrid
systems and Theorem proving and Formal verification
1. Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) such as aircraft control systems, robots, or par-
tially/fully self-driving cars are very exciting [Nerode, 2007, Pappas, 2011, Alur,
2015]. They are also formidably challenging to get right due to their physi-
cal dynamics and all their subtle interactions with the partially unknown en-
vironment. That is where differential dynamic logic dL [Platzer, 2008, Platzer,
2010b, Platzer, 2012c, Platzer, 2012b, Platzer, 2017a, Platzer, 2018a] comes in as
a language to express formal specifications for hybrid system models of CPSs.
Hybrid systems [Grossman et al., 1993] are the basis of all CPS models, because
they feature both discrete dynamics (e.g., coming from the stepwise computation
and decisions in a computer) and continuous dynamics (e.g., coming from the
physical motion of a car).
Differential dynamic logic provides modal formulas [α]P that express that all
behavior of hybrid system α is such that the states α reaches satisfy P , which



















P → [α]Q expresses that: if formula P is true initially, then after all runs of
hybrid system α is formula Q true. This particular formula is like a Hoare triple
{P}α {Q} except that it works for hybrid systems instead of conventional discrete
programs [Hoare, 1969]. Yet, differential dynamic logic is more general, because
it also makes it possible to state logical formulas of other forms beyond safety.
The [α]P formula of differential dynamic logic plays a similar role to the P
formula of temporal logic [Pnueli, 1977,Prior, 1957] in speaking about P always
being true, except that it is parametrized by the particular hybrid systems α
after all whose runs P is true. That makes it possible for dL formulas to refer to
multiple hybrid systems α, β at once. The formula [α]P → [β]P , e.g., expresses
that if after all runs of α is P true, then also after all runs of β is P true. The
use of differential dynamic logic is not limited to specification purposes but also
provides verification techniques by systematically reducing dL formulas to simpler
dL formulas by logical transformations until the resulting formulas can be proved.
Fortunately, differential dynamic logic is not just for pen-and-paper proofs
but is implemented1 in the theorem prover KeYmaera X [Fulton et al., 2015]
that makes it possible to conduct rigorous formal proofs with tool support and
substantial levels of proof automation including invariant generation [Sogokon
et al., 2019]. The tool KeYmaera X was instrumental for verifying challenging
applications, including ground robot obstacle avoidance [Mitsch et al., 2017b],
railway systems [Mitsch et al., 2017a], and the Next-generation Airborne Collision
Avoidance System ACAS X [Jeannin et al., 2017]. Safety guarantees provided by
differential dynamic logic can also transcend models and translate into reality.
KeYmaera X implements the transfer of safety proofs for CPS models to CPS
implementations by synthesizing provably correct runtime monitors with Model-
Plex [Mitsch and Platzer, 2016b], which result in CPS executables that are for-
mally verified in a chain of theorem provers [Bohrer et al., 2018]. ModelPlex is also
the basis for enabling safe artificial intelligence in cyber-physical systems [Platzer,
2019a] by wrapping reinforcement learning in a verified safety sandbox [Fulton
and Platzer, 2018] and steering back toward safety when outside the confounds
of a well-modeled part of the system behavior [Fulton and Platzer, 2019]. These
results that will be surveyed here provide rigorous safety guarantees for CPS im-
plementations (even those that involve machine learning) without having to deal
with the entire complexity of their implementation during verification.
While a brief overview is given here, significantly more elaborate detail can
be found in a recent textbook2 on Logical Foundations of Cyber-Physical Systems
[Platzer, 2018a] as well as a research monograph on Logical Analysis of Hybrid
Systems [Platzer, 2010b]. A technical survey of basic differential dynamic logic
can be found in a LICS’12 tutorial [Platzer, 2012c].
2. CPS Programs
Hybrid systems are mathematical models that combine discrete dynamical sys-
tems with continuous dynamical systems as is crucial to understand CPSs. A vari-
1The KeYmaera X prover is available at http://keymaeraX.org/
2Including supporting slides and video lectures are at http://lfcps.org/lfcps/
ety of different types of hybrid system models have been developed, including hy-
brid automata [Nerode and Kohn, 1992,Alur et al., 1992], hybrid Petri nets [David
and Alla, 2001], hybrid CSP [Chaochen et al., 1995] and hybrid process alge-
bras [Cuijpers and Reniers, 2005]. The Logical Foundations of Cyber-Physical
Systems are best built on hybrid programs [Platzer, 2008,Platzer, 2010b,Platzer,
2012c,Platzer, 2012b,Platzer, 2017a,Platzer, 2018a], which represent hybrid sys-
tems in a programming language that includes differential equations. The rela-
tionship of hybrid programs to hybrid automata is similar to that of regular lan-
guages to finite automata. The advantage of hybrid programs for verification pur-
poses is that they make it possible to leverage programming language composi-
tionality principles to completely decompose the analysis of hybrid programs into
respective analyses of their pieces [Platzer, 2008,Platzer, 2012b,Platzer, 2017a].
Syntax. Unlike conventional discrete programs, hybrid programs provide differ-
ential equations as primitives for continuous dynamics. In order to do justice
to the demands of cyber-physical systems, hybrid programs feature real number
computations and natively offer nondeterminism with which uncertainty about
the evolution of the physical world can be expressed. Such nondeterminism is
crucial to accurately capture the fact that we have limited knowledge about what
other agents in the physical environment may do (it really is hard to know what
exactly the car in front of you will do when). But nondeterminism also comes in
handy when we want to be deliberately imprecise about what happens when in
our own control in order to arrive at a more abstract but easier model (even if
we could in principle know exactly when our car controller speeds up or slows
down as a function of distance, speed limit, gear, gas-air-ratio, engine rotations
per minute, and passenger comfort goals, we may be better off retaining a more
abstract nondeterministic decision to either accelerate or brake).
Definition 1 (Hybrid programs). The syntax of hybrid programs (HP) is described
by the following grammar where α, β are hybrid programs, x is a variable and
e, f(x) are terms, Q is a (usually first-order) logical formula:
α, β ::= x := e | ?Q | x′ = f(x) &Q | α ∪ β | α;β | α∗
Polynomial terms e suffice, but rational functions can be used (when not
dividing by zero [Bohrer et al., 2019]). The assignment x := e instantaneously
changes the value of variable x to the value of the term e by a discrete jump.
The test ?Q checks if formula Q is true in the current state and aborts the
execution discarding the run otherwise. That is, tests have absolutely no effect on
the state of the system except that they abort executions that do not pass them.
Such tests are useful to impose conditions on the (especially branching) execution
of a system. Most importantly, the differential equation x′ = f(x) &Q can be
followed for any nondeterministic amount of time (including 0), but only as long
as the logical formula Q is true at every time along the solution of x′ = f(x). In
particular, just like in a failed test, it is impossible to run a differential equation
for any amount of time at all unless Q is true in the beginning.
The nondeterministic choice α ∪ β can either run the hybrid program α
or the program β. It is the fundamental branching construct, making no prior
commitment as to which side is run. Unlike α ∪ β which either runs α or β,
the sequential composition α;β first runs α and then β. It is the fundamental
construct for running things in succession. Finally, the nondeterministic repetition
α∗ will repeatedly run hybrid program α any arbitrary natural number of times,
including possibly 0 times. It is the fundamental construct for repeated actions.
Example 1 (Bouncing ball). As a simple hybrid system, consider a bouncing ball
at altitude x with velocity v that is bouncing up and down over time subject to
gravity x′ = v, v′ = −g where g > 0 is the constant for gravity (Fig. 1). Since the
({x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0};
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Figure 1. Hybrid program and sample trajectory of a bouncing ball (plotted as height over time)
bouncing ball is unable to fall through the ground at position 0, the differential
equation is limited to remain above ground x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0. That is, the
bouncing ball can continue falling in gravity for any amount of time, but can never
fall through the cracks in the ground. After the bouncing ball stops its continuous
evolution, it follows a nondeterministic choice whose right branch tests whether
the ball is in the air (with the test ?x 6= 0) in which case no change happens.
Its left branch tests if the ball lies on the ground (test ?x = 0) and then inverts
the velocity by a discrete assignment (v :=−cv) subject to a damping coefficient
0 ≤ c ≤ 1. That is why the discrete controller in line 2 is can also be written as
if(x = 0) v :=−cv. Because the velocity will be flipped from negative to positive
when on the ground, that will send the ball flying back up in the air as soon
as it next continues along x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0 after repeating the loop. The
repetition operator (∗) at the end of the hybrid program in Fig. 1 indicates that
it can be repeated any arbitrary number of times.
Note that all choices in all operators of hybrid programs are resolved nonde-
terministically. The differential equation can be stopped at any time (just can-
not violate the evolution domain constraint x ≥ 0). When stopped above ground
(x > 0), the subsequent discrete controller has no effect and the only way forward
is to, nondeterministically, stop or repeat the loop and, if it the loop is repeated,
continue along the same differential equation in line 1. At the latest on the ground
(x = 0), however, does the differential equation have to stop and give the discrete
control a chance to inspect the state and flip the sign of the velocity. Also note how
some choices, e.g., the nondeterministic choice ∪ in Fig. 1 are nondeterministic
but, because of the subsequent tests in both subprograms, really only one choice
will succeed in every state. That is why a nondeterministic default is helpful,
because more deterministic behavior can always be defined by imposing suitable
tests in the execution of a nondeterministic program. Conversely, a deterministic
program cannot properly be made nondeterministic anymore.
While bouncing balls are really no cyber-physical systems (they apparently
forgot their computing devices), their behavior can still be explained very well
with a prototypical hybrid system where the mix of discrete and continuous dy-
namics comes from describing the sudden bounce back from the ground versus
the continuous flying and falling above ground. It is much easier to understand
bouncing balls from such a hybrid systems perspective than to investigate the
fast-paced continuous deformation of the ball on the ground happening at a very
different time scale than its continuous flying and falling in gravity.
What is crucial for cyber-physical systems is not only the addition of differ-
ential equations, but also to embrace nondeterminism and real-valued quantities.
Semantics. The effect of running a hybrid program is that the state of the system
changes, which is why the semantics of hybrid programs is defined as the relation
it induces between initial and final states. Because of the nondeterminism, some
hybrid programs may reach multiple (or no) final states from a given initial state.
A state is a mapping ω that assigns a real number ω(x) ∈ R to each variable x.
The set of all states is denoted S. The real value of a term e in state ω is written
ω[[e]] and defined as usual in real arithmetic.
Definition 2 (Transition semantics). The semantics of an HP α defines the tran-
sition relation [[α]] ⊆ S × S of initial and final states inductively:
[[x := e]] = {(ω, ν) : ν = ω except that ν[[x]] = ω[[e]]}
[[?Q]] = {(ω, ω) : ω ∈ [[Q]]}
[[x′ = f(x) &Q]] =
{
(ω, ν) : ϕ(0) = ω except at x′ and ϕ(r) = ν for a solution
ϕ:[0, r]→ S of any duration r satisfying ϕ |= x′ = f(x) ∧Q}
[[α ∪ β]] = [[α]] ∪ [[β]]
[[α;β]] = [[α]] ◦ [[β]] = {(ω, ν) : (ω, µ) ∈ [[α]], (µ, ν) ∈ [[β]]}
[[α∗]] = [[α]]∗ =
⋃
n∈N
[[αn]] with αn+1 ≡ αn;α and α0 ≡ ?true
where ϕ |= x′ = f(x) ∧Q, iff for all times 0 ≤ z ≤ r: ϕ(z) ∈ [[x′ = f(x) ∧Q]] with
ϕ(z)(x′) def= dϕ(t)(x)dt (z) and ϕ(z) = ϕ(0) except at x, x
′.
That is, the relation ϕ |= x′ = f(x) ∧Q holds when ϕ is a solution of the
differential equation x′ = f(x) that respects the evolution domain constraint Q
at every point in time and, of course, no other variable changes except those
indicated by the differential equation. The semantics is explicit change: nothing
changes unless the hybrid program indicates how.
The semantics [[α ∪ β]] of a nondeterministic choice α ∪ β is the union [[α]] ∪
[[β]] of the individual semantics’, which is where the notation comes from. The
semantics [[α;β]] of a sequential composition α;β is the relation composition [[α]] ◦
[[β]]. The semantics [[α∗]] of a nondeterministic repetition is the reflexive transitive
closure [[α]]
∗
of the semantics [[α]] of α or, equivalently, the semantics of all the
n-fold iterations αn of α. The semantics of an assignment x := e changes the value
of the variable x in the new state ν to the real value ω[[e]] that the right-hand side
term e had in the old state ω. The semantics [[?Q]] of a test ?Q does not change
the state but a transition is only possible in a state ω that is in the set of all
states in which Q is true (written [[Q]] and defined in Def. 4 below).
3. Differential Dynamic Logic
Differential dynamic logic dL [Platzer, 2008,Platzer, 2010b,Platzer, 2012c,Platzer,
2012b,Platzer, 2017a,Platzer, 2018a] provides specification and verification tech-
niques for hybrid systems written as hybrid programs.
Syntax. The defining constructs of differential dynamic logic are the pair of
modalities [α] and 〈α〉 for every hybrid program α, which can be used in front of
any dL formula P . The dL formula [α]P is true in any state in which P is true
after all runs of hybrid program α. The dL formula 〈α〉P is true if there is a run
of hybrid program α after which P is true. The rest of dL is built like first-order
logic of real arithmetic including quantifiers over the reals. Real arithmetic makes
the most sense when talking about the real positions and velocities of CPSs.
Definition 3 (dL formulas). The syntax of formulas of differential dynamic logic
is described by the following grammar where P,Q are formulas, e, e˜ are terms, x
is a variable and α is a hybrid program:
P,Q ::= e = e˜ | e ≥ e˜ | ¬P | P ∧Q | P ∨Q | P → Q | ∀xP | ∃xP | [α]P | 〈α〉P
Bi-implications P ↔ Q are defined syntactically as mutual implication (P →
Q)∧(Q→ P ). Likewise, other operators such as >,≤, <, 6= are definable as usual.
By combining the operators it is easy to express various correctness state-
ments about hybrid systems. For example, a dL formula of the shape P → [α]Q
says that if P is true then all runs of α satisfy Q. Hence, P → [α]Q is valid (true
in all states) when formula Q is, indeed, true after all runs of hybrid system α that
start in an initial state where formula P is true (safety). Likewise, P → 〈α〉Q says
that if P is true then there is a run of α after which Q is true (liveness). Other
correctness properties mix multiple modalities in the same formula. For example,
P → [α]〈β〉Q expresses that if P is true (initially), then after all behaviors of α,
there is a run of β that makes Q true in the end. The formula P → ([α]Q↔ [β]Q)
expresses a conditional equivalence that if P is true (initially), then all behaviors
of α satisfy Q iff all behaviors of β satisfy Q. Quantifiers can be useful, e.g., to
say that for all (initial) positions x there is an (initial) velocity v for which all
behavior of car α obeys a safety property P as ∀x∃v [α]P .
Example 2 (Bouncing ball conjecture). Continuing with the hybrid program from
Example 1, a dL formula expressing safety of the bouncing ball is the following:
0 ≤ x ∧ x = H →[({x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0}; (?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0))∗] (0 ≤ x ∧ x ≤ H)
It expresses that if the bouncing ball starts at the initial height H above ground,
then it will always remain above ground but below initial height (0 ≤ x∧x ≤ H).
Unfortunately, no matter how intuitive such a claim may look like at first glance,
the above dL formula is not actually true for all (initial) values of x, v, g, c,H. Of
course, if the initial values of x and H disagree, then the formula is vacuously true,
because the left-hand side of its implication is false. But additional assumptions
are also needed on the other variables as well to make the formula true for all
(initial) values of all variables. Which assumptions are those?
Semantics. Strictly speaking, the definitions of hybrid programs (Def. 1) and of
differential dynamic logic formulas (Def. 3) are mutually inductive, because hy-
brid programs occur in modal formulas while formulas occur in tests or evolution
domain constraints. That is why their semantics is also defined by mutual induc-
tion (Def. 2 and Def. 4). But since not much intuition is lost when first imagining
only simple arithmetic formulas can occur in hybrid programs (so-called poor test
dL), this subtlety is often glossed over in the interest of a simple presentation.
The meaning of a dL formula is the set of all states in which it is true (from
which the set of all states in which it is false can be read off by complementation).
Definition 4 (Semantics). The semantics of formulas is defined inductively, for
each dL formula P , as the set of states, written [[P ]] ⊆ S, in which P is true:
[[e = e˜]] = {ω : ω[[e]] = ω[[e˜]]}
[[e ≥ e˜]] = {ω : ω[[e]] ≥ ω[[e˜]]}
[[¬P ]] = [[P ]]{ = S \ [[P ]]
[[P ∧Q]] = [[P ]] ∩ [[Q]]
[[P ∨Q]] = [[P ]] ∪ [[Q]]
[[P → Q]] = [[P ]]{ ∪ [[Q]]
[[∃xP ]] = {ω : ν ∈ [[P ]] for some state ν that agrees with ω except on x}
[[∀xP ]] = {ω : ν ∈ [[P ]] for all states ν that agree with ω except on x}
[[〈α〉P ]] = {ω : ν ∈ [[P ]] for some state ν such that (ω, ν) ∈ [[α]]}
[[[α]P ]] = {ω : ν ∈ [[P ]] for all states ν such that (ω, ν) ∈ [[α]]}
A dL formula P is valid, written  P , iff it is true in all states, i.e., [[P ]] = S.
The formula [α]P is true in any state ω from which all states ν reachable
after running hybrid program α satisfy P . The formula 〈α〉P is true in any state
ω from which there is a state ν that is reachable after running hybrid program α
and that satisfies P .
Valid formulas are the most valuable ones, because we can rely on them being
true no matter what state a system is presently in. For example, an implication
P → Q is valid iff [[P ]] ⊆ [[Q]], i.e., the set of all states in which P is true is a
subset of the set of all states in which Q is true. A bi-implication P ↔ Q is valid
iff [[P ]] = [[Q]], i.e., the set of all states in which P is true is the same as the set of
all states in which Q is true.
Example 3 (Bouncing ball safety). Augmenting Example 2 with sufficiently many
assumptions on other variables to make the formula about the behavior of bounc-
ing balls valid (so true in all states) leads, e.g., to the following dL formula:
0 ≤ x ∧ x = H ∧ v = 0 ∧ g > 0 ∧ 1 = c→[({x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0}; (?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0))∗] (0 ≤ x ∧ x ≤ H)
Of course, slightly more general dL formulas are valid as well. But assuming
damping coefficient c = 1, for example, has the pleasant effect of considerably
simplifying notation subsequently.
4. Dynamic Axioms for Dynamical Systems
Definitions 2 and 4 give dL a rigorous mathematical semantics but, except in
simple cases, working through their uncountable sets of states does not exactly
give a particularly practical way of establishing whether formulas are true in a
state let alone valid (so true in all states). Differential dynamic logic is not just
useful for specifying CPS but also for verifying CPS thanks to its proof calculus,
with which the validity of formulas can be established by a finite syntactic proof
instead of the uncountably infinite sets of states in the semantics.
Axioms and proof rules for differential dynamic logic [Platzer, 2012b,Platzer,
2017a] are listed in Fig. 2. The usual axioms and proof rules for propositional
connectives and first-order logic can be used as a basis [Platzer, 2008, Platzer,
2018a] but are not discussed further here.
〈·〉 〈α〉P ↔ ¬[α]¬P
[:=] [x := e]p(x)↔ p(e)
[?] [?Q]P ↔ (Q→ P )
[′] [x′ = f(x)]p(x)↔ ∀t≥0 [x := y(t)]p(x) (y′(t) = f(y))
[∪] [α ∪ β]P ↔ [α]P ∧ [β]P
[;] [α;β]P ↔ [α][β]P
[∗] [α∗]P ↔ P ∧ [α][α∗]P
K [α](P → Q)→ ([α]P → [α]Q)
I [α∗]P ↔ P ∧ [α∗](P → [α]P )




Figure 2. Differential dynamic logic axioms and proof rules
4.1. Axioms
The idea behind the axioms in Fig. 2 is that, when used to (equivalently) reduce
the (usually left) blue side to the rest, they symbolically decompose a property
of a larger hybrid program into a range of properties of its pieces. For example,
the axiom of nondeterministic choice [∪] is an equivalence that makes it possible
to replace any formula of the shape [α ∪ β]P equivalently with a corresponding
conjunction [α]P ∧ [β]P that expresses safety of smaller subprograms. Since both
sides are equivalent according to axiom [∪], replacing one side by the other in
any context does not change the overall truth. But the right-hand side of axiom
[∪] consists of structurally simpler formulas, because all its hybrid programs are
simpler than those on the left-hand side, so that using axiom [∪] to replace the
left by the right side makes progress in simplifying formulas. Depending on the
polarity (number of negations in negation normal form) with which [α ∪ β]P
occurs in a formula, either the right-to-left or left-to-right implication of axiom
[∪] is needed to justify correctness of that transformation. Since axiom [∪], like
most others, is an equivalence axiom, it is easy to see (and easy to prove [Platzer,
2017a]) why any occurrence of a formula of the form [α ∪ β]P can be replaced
equivalently by the corresponding equivalent [α]P ∧[β]P regardless of the context.
The sequential composition axiom [;] performs a more subtle simplifying de-
composition by making it possible to equivalently replace formulas of the form
[α;β]P with more complex hybrid programs into nested modalities [α][β]P with
more complex postconditions but smaller hybrid programs (no ; anymore).
The assignment axiom [:=] has no more subprograms to work with but ex-
presses that p(x) is true after assigning x := e iff p(e) is true before. Tests are han-
dled by axiom [?] which expresses that P holds after running test ?Q iff Q → P
holds now, because the test can only run successfully when Q was indeed true.
Axiom [′] replaces differential equations equivalently by a universally quantified
property of their solution y satisfying y′(t) = f(y) and y(0) = x. This works
for simple differential equations whose solutions are expressible in real arithmetic
(and continues to work with slight modifications in the presence of evolution
domain constraints), but is hopeless for “serious” differential equations.
More involved differential equations use inductive proof techniques based on
differential invariants [Platzer, 2010a, Platzer, 2010b, Platzer, 2017a] that can
prove all their real arithmetic invariants in differential dynamic logic [Platzer and
Tan, 2018]. The basic idea of differential invariants is to prove them inductively
by proving that their derivatives along the differential equation satisfy the same
logical relations. Other steps in such proofs successively accumulate knowledge
about the evolution of the differential equation in its evolution domain constraint
(differential cut) or soundly edit the differential equation (differential ghost) as
elaborated elsewhere [Platzer, 2012c,Platzer, 2017a,Platzer and Tan, 2018].
4.2. Proof Rules
Loops can be unwound finitely with the iteration axiom [∗] or proved by the induc-
tion axiom I. As usual, the postcondition P may need to be strengthened to iden-
tify a proper loop invariant J . This strengthening ultimately uses Kripke’s modal
modus ponens axiom K or Go¨del’s generalization rule G, but is also packaged up
with a derived proof rule in sequent calculus:
loop
Γ ` J,∆ J ` [α]J J ` P
Γ ` [α∗]P,∆
As usual in classical logics, the meaning of a sequent Γ ` ∆ is the meaning of the
formula (
∧
P∈Γ P ) → (
∨
Q∈∆Q). That is, the meaning of a comma in the list of
assumptions or antecedent Γ is conjunctive while the meaning of a comma in the
succedent ∆ is disjunctive. Sequents are particularly useful for normalizing the
shape of logical formulas.
Finally, axiom 〈·〉 uses dualities of modalities to make duals of all reasoning
principles for box modalities from the other axioms available for diamond modali-
ties. The vacuous axiom V is special in that it is only applicable if the free variables
of p do not intersect the bound variables written by α, i.e., FV(p)∩BV(α) = ∅. It
shows in a single step that the truth of formulas p remains unaffected by running α
if p does not depend on any variable that program α changes. A more refined uni-
form substitution calculus for dL [Platzer, 2017a] completely avoids any such side
conditions in the entire calculus. Uniform substitutions make logics significantly
easier to implement and improve robustness, which is why the implementation of
dL is entirely based on uniform substitutions [Fulton et al., 2015].
The differential dynamic logic proof calculus successively reduces properties
of hybrid systems to formulas of real arithmetic, which is a surprisingly tame logic
where validity is decidable [Tarski, 1951, Collins, 1975, Collins and Hong, 1991],
although in general of doubly exponential complexity in the number of quantifier
block alternations [Weispfenning, 1988,Davenport and Heintz, 1988].
Example 4 (Bouncing ball proof). The conjectured validity of the bouncing ball
dL formula from Example 3, of course, deserves a proper dL proof as justification.
It is easy to conduct such a proof after choosing a suitable loop invariant j(x,v).
The proof uses abbreviations for the initial condition (A), postcondition (B(x,v)),
and for the differential equation with its evolution domain constraint (x′′..):
A
def≡ 0 ≤ x ∧ x = H ∧ v = 0 ∧ g > 0 ∧ 1 = c
B(x,v)
def≡ 0 ≤ x ∧ x ≤ H
x′′..
def≡ {x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0}
The first step of the proof (starting at the desired conclusion at the very bottom)
is to use a propositional implication rule →R to assume the left-hand side of the
implication (A) in the antecedent and proceed to prove its right-hand side. Using
rule loop with a loop invariant j(x,v) (identified later), postcondition B(x,v) of the
nondeterministic repetition is proved by showing that j(x,v) follows from the initial
condition A (left premise), inductively remains true when running a round of the
loop (middle premise), and finally implies the postcondition (right premise):
A ` j(x,v) j(x,v) ` [x′′..; (?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0)]j(x,v) j(x,v) ` B(x,v)
loop A ` [(x′′..; (?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0))∗]B(x,v)
→R ` A→ [(x′′..; (?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0))∗]B(x,v)
The proof of the middle premise continues in Fig. 3. That proof is follow-your-
nose except that it saves some writing by using a derived monotonicity rule that
makes it possible to replace postcondition P by a postcondition Q implying P :
[;]
MR





j(x,v), x = 0 ` j(x,−cv)
j(x,v), x=0 ` [v :=−cv]j(x,v)
j(x,v) ` [?x=0][v :=−cv]j(x,v)
j(x,v) ` [?x=0; v :=−cv]j(x,v) [?]
j(x,v), x6=0 ` j(x,v)
j(x,v) ` [?x 6=0]j(x,v)
j(x,v) ` [?x = 0; v :=−cv]j(x,v) ∧ [?x 6= 0]j(x,v)
j(x,v) ` [?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0]j(x,v)
j(x,v) ` [x′′..][?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0]j(x,v)
j(x,v) ` [x′′..; (?x = 0; v :=−cv ∪ ?x 6= 0)]j(x,v)
Figure 3. Sequent calculus proof shape for induction step of bouncing ball
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Γ ` [α]Q,∆ Q ` P
Γ ` [α]P,∆
The remaining four branches of arithmetic and the differential equation property
j(x,v) ` [x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0]j(x,v) make it fairly easy to prove or disprove
concrete invariant candidate choices for j(x,v) using decision procedures for real
arithmetic [Collins and Hong, 1991] and either solution axioms or dL proofs for
ODE invariants [Platzer and Tan, 2018]. It is also not difficult to generate a
suitable invariant j(x,v) from the desired ODE invariance property [Platzer, 2018a]:
j(x,v)
def≡ 2gx = 2gH − v2 ∧ x ≥ 0
This invariant makes it possible to complete the bouncing ball proof with the
constant assumptions c = 1 ∧ g > 0, which are easily added [Platzer, 2018a].
Working with the solution x(t) = x+vt− g2 t2, v(t) = v−gt suffices for proving
all differential equation properties arising in the above example. But differential
invariants enable a significantly easier proof from the differential equation itself
instead of its more complicated solution. The following special case of the more
general differential invariants proof rule suffices here:
dI
Q ` [x′:=f(x)](e)′ = (e˜)′
e = e˜ ` [x′ = f(x) &Q]e = e˜
Here, dI shows that an equality e = e˜ always remains true after an ODE x′ = f(x)
by proving that its differentials (e)′ and (e˜)′ are equal after assigning f(x) to x′.
∗
R x ≥ 0 ` 2gv = −2v(−g)
[:=] x ≥ 0 ` [x′:=v][v′:=− g]2gx′ = −2vv′
dI 2gx = 2gH − v2 ` [x′ = v, v′ = −g&x ≥ 0]2gx = 2gH − v2
4.3. Soundness and Completeness
While not the focus of this overview, differential dynamic logic also enjoys very
strong theoretical properties. The most important property of soundness (all for-
mulas that have a dL proof are valid) is a conditio sine qua non, a condition with-
out which logic could not be. And, of course, soundness holds for the dL calcu-
lus [Platzer, 2008, Platzer, 2012b, Platzer, 2017a] as has even been cross-verified
in both Isabelle/HOL and Coq [Bohrer et al., 2017]. The converse question of
completeness, i.e., whether all true dL formulas have a dL proof, is more compli-
cated. It is answered in the affirmative both for completeness relative to differen-
tial equations and relative to discrete dynamics (precise statements can be found
in the literature [Platzer, 2008,Platzer, 2012b,Platzer, 2017a]).
Theorem 1 (Continuous relative completeness of dL [Platzer, 2008, Platzer,
2012b]). The dL calculus is a sound and complete axiomatization of hybrid sys-
tems relative to differential equations, i.e., every valid dL formula can be derived
in the dL calculus from valid differential equation tautologies.
Theorem 2 (Discrete relative completeness of dL [Platzer, 2012b]). The dL calculus
is a sound and complete axiomatization of hybrid systems relative to discrete
dynamics, i.e., every valid dL formula can be derived in the dL calculus from valid
discrete system tautologies.
In particular, relative completeness theorems (which have constructive proofs)
imply that the required (variants or) invariants are always expressible in dL to
succeed with the proofs. If the invariants are in real arithmetic, the remaining
questions about differential equations are completely provable in the dL calculus
(again referring to the literature [Platzer and Tan, 2018] for precise statements):
Theorem 3 (Invariant completeness of dL [Platzer and Tan, 2018]). The dL calculus
is a sound and complete axiomatization of arithmetic invariants of differential
equations, i.e., all true real arithmetic invariants of differential equations are
provable in dL (and all false ones are disprovable in dL).
Moreover, real arithmetic invariants of differential equations are decidable
directly by a derived axiom of dL [Platzer and Tan, 2018]. In particular, in the
common case where the respective hybrid system invariants that always exist in dL
by Theorem 1 for valid safety formulas are actually real arithmetical, Theorem 3
guarantees that the resulting differential equation properties are provable in dL if
and only if they are true. In theory, the only thing that can go wrong in a hybrid
systems safety proof of a valid formula is that the required invariants exist in dL
but are not real arithmetical. In practice, what can still go wrong, in addition, is
that scalability limits make the resulting computations infeasible. This is where
user guidance in a theorem prover can help get proofs unstuck with user insights
about the CPS design that the proof automation fails to find.
4.4. dL Proofs in The KeYmaera X Theorem Prover
The differential dynamic logic proof calculus is implemented in the theorem
prover KeYmaera X [Fulton et al., 2015] (along with an implementation of dif-
ferential game logic for hybrid games [Platzer, 2015] that is not the focus here).
The prover implements the uniform substitution calculus for differential dynamic
logic [Platzer, 2017a] (and differential game logic [Platzer, 2018b,Platzer, 2019b]).
The advantage of a uniform substitution design is that this leads to a minimal
soundness-critical core consisting only of a verbatim copy of each axiom formula
besides the uniform substitution application mechanism and renaming. For per-
formance reasons, KeYmaera X also implements a propositional sequent calculus
with Skolemization [Platzer, 2008] to efficiently normalize logical formulas. This
gives KeYmaera X a minimal soundness-critical core of under 2000 lines of code.
At the same time, KeYmaera X provides a language for custom tactics [Fulton
et al., 2017], sophisticated proof automation, including invariant generation [So-
gokon et al., 2019], and a versatile user interface [Mitsch and Platzer, 2016a], but
those are markedly outside the soundness-critical part of KeYmaera X even if still
just as important for practical verification in KeYmaera X.
For deciding formulas of real arithmetic, KeYmaera X calls Mathematica
[Wolfram, 2019] or Z3 [de Moura and Bjørner, 2008, Jovanovic´ and de Moura,
2012]. Instead of trusting those solvers, polynomial witnesses can be used to
rigorously prove the validity of universal real arithmetic formulas [Harrison, 2007,
Platzer et al., 2009]. In theory, that is complete for universal real arithmetic but
only works in practice for medium complexity problems. While proof-producing
real arithmetic decision procedures exist [McLaughlin and Harrison, 2005], they
are only used in the old KeYmaera 3 prover [Platzer and Quesel, 2008], because
their scalability is limited to low-dimensional problems. In the older KeYmaera
3, real arithmetic can also be decided with virtual substitution [Weispfenning,
1997] using Redlog [Dolzmann and Sturm, 1997], which works in cases where
the polynomial degrees remain at most cubic. Generally, however, more scalable
verification of nonlinear real arithmetic remains an important future challenge.
5. ModelPlex: Model Safety Transfer
KeYmaera X provides automatic and interactive and programmable ways for
rigorously proving the safety (or other properties) of hybrid systems in differential
dynamic logic. However useful and reassuring that is for the hybrid system and
its control, it is important to realize that the outcome is still a statement about
the hybrid system, which is a mathematical model of the cyber-physical system.
A safety proof for a hybrid system only implies the safety of a cyber-physical
system to the extent that the hybrid system is an adequate model of the CPS.
If we rename a KeYmaera X input file from bouncing-ball.kyx to car.kyx
and prove it, then we have not made any actual car any safer, because bouncing
ball models are quite inappropriate models for cars. In a sense, of course, the
appropriate course of action is that we then need to get a better model and put it
into car.kyx. But how do we then really argue that a safety proof of the model
in the improved car.kyx file entails that the car is safe while a safety proof of
the bouncing-ball.kyx model did not? Or what would it take to argue that
bouncing-ball.kyx at least is a good model for bouncing balls (spoiler alert: it
is not as long as we keep the assumption c = 1). This requires us to prove that
we built the right model (does it suitably model all real behavior) and not just
that the model was built right (its controllers work safely in that model).
Proving safety of a real CPS is surprisingly subtle, precisely because it does
not help to fall back to even more models along the way that need to be justified,
too, to accurately reflect reality. The solution to cut through this Gordian knot of
model mysteries is ModelPlex, which provides a way to rigorously transfer safety
proofs of hybrid systems models to safety results about real CPS implementations
[Mitsch and Platzer, 2016b]. The way it works is that ModelPlex conducts a proof
in differential dynamic logic about the safe behavior of the real CPS that combines
the dL safety proof about the hybrid systems model with proofs obtained online
from monitors that witness the compatibility of the observed real executions of
the CPS with the safety-critical part of the hybrid systems model. This results in
a proof in which the majority of the work is performed offline ahead of time, while
a few critical measurements performed by monitors fill in online at runtime the
parts of the proof that link to reality and are unprovable offline. But the required
monitors are proved safe in dL ahead of time and synthesized along with their








Figure 4. ModelPlex monitor sits between controller and actuator to check the controller’s de-
cisions for compliance with the model based on sensor data with veto leading to a safe fallback
When run on the CPS, synthesized ModelPlex monitors check model compli-
ance and safeguard decisions obtained by the unverified controller implementation
(Fig. 4). In that respect, ModelPlex monitors are used like Simplex monitors [Seto
et al., 1998], except that ModelPlex monitors are proved correct, synthesized from
the verified models, and not only worry about the safety of the controls but also
ensure safe compliance with the whole model (hence the name ModelPlex).
Example 5 (Correct controller monitor). A provably correct runtime monitor for
the bouncing ball controller from Example 3 is as follows [Platzer, 2018a, Ex. 19.3]:(
x = 0 ∧ v+ = −v ∨ x > 0 ∧ v+ = v) ∧ x+ = x
This formula expresses a relation for acceptable transitions of the controller im-
plementation from old values of x and v to new values x+ and v+.
Example 6 (Correct model monitor). A provably correct runtime monitor for the
bouncing ball model from Example 3 is the following [Platzer, 2018a, Prop. 19.1]:
2g(x+ − x) = v2 − (v+)2 ∧ x ≥ 0 ∧ (x+ > 0 ∧ v+ ≤ v ∨ x+ = 0 ∧ v+ ≥ −v)
Monitors get even more subtle with the uncertainty of partially observable
hybrid systems, but ModelPlex generalizes suitably [Mitsch and Platzer, 2018].
The point is, however, that both monitors from Examples 5 and 6 are violated
when comparing the behavior with a real bouncing ball, whether uncertainty is
taken into account or not. This shows, for example, that c = 1 is an unrealistic
assumption for a true damping coefficient, which, after all, makes a real bouncing
ball bounce back up less over time (recall Fig. 1).
6. VeriPhy: Executable Proof Transfer
The ModelPlex monitors synthesized for safeguarding the transfer of safety prop-
erties of a hybrid system to a real CPS are a crucial ingredient. But they are also
not directly executable without error on a real CPS. The reason is that ModelPlex
monitors are correct mathematical conditions for the safety transfer from models
to reality, but are still phrased in real arithmetic. Real arithmetic provides the
right setting in which to establish the safety of motion in the real world from one
real-valued position to another connected by the real-valued differential equations
of the model. But such infinite precision real arithmetic is hardly executable on
any actual CPU in any reasonable amount of time (or at all). There is also still
a gap between knowing the right formulas to monitor from ModelPlex and being
able to run proper safe executables on the computation devices of a CPS.
This is where VeriPhy comes in, the verified pipeline with which verified con-
troller executables can be generated from verified cyber-physical system mod-
els [Bohrer et al., 2018]. VeriPhy adds machine executability in provably correct
ways to the mathematical accuracy of ModelPlex monitors. It turns a hybrid
systems model verified safe in KeYmaera X into executable machine code for a
sandbox that inherits safety for the real CPS in provably safe ways with a chain
of proofs in theorem provers. The resulting CPS sandbox checks and corrects all
actions of an unverified CPS controller provided separately, and safely flags plant
violations when possibly unsafe deviations are detected compared to the safe be-
havior of the model. The last step of the VeriPhy pipeline compiles provably cor-
rectly to CakeML [Kumar et al., 2014], thanks to which machine code can be
generated provably correctly for multiple CPUs, e.g., x64 and arm6 architectures.
At this point, one might take the bouncing ball model from Example 3 that
was verified in Example 4 and generate provably correct machine code for it with
VeriPhy, which will use the synthesized ModelPlex controller and plant moni-
tors from Examples 5 and 6, respectively. But, admittedly, purchasing a genuine
bouncing ball would have led to an easier and more realistic execution platform,
which, furthermore, would not have fallen prey to the deficiencies caused imme-
diately by the unrealistic assumption c = 1. Yet, that is a consequence of the
fact that the discrete operations in Example 3 were just a description of bouncing
ball physics, and not within the purview of an ingenious cyber controller that
is in active need to control how balls bounce. The discrete control of a robot’s
ping-pong paddle to react upon the motion of a ping-pong ball [Platzer, 2018a]
would have led to a related model in which VeriPhy would serve a better purpose.
7. Safe Learning in CPS
The logical foundations that have been surveyed thus far give a solid basis for
the development of provably correct cyber-physical systems [Platzer, 2018a]. But
an additional twist arises for autonomous cyber-physical systems [Platzer, 2019a]
that achieve smart and largely unsupervised decisions on their own using machine
learning and artificial intelligence (AI) techniques. The extra complication is that
their behavior is not just a consequence of their programming, but also of their
experience and the data they learned from, which is stored, e.g., in policy tables
that influence their future decisions [Russel and Norvig, 1995]. Lauded for their
flexibility, this AI phenomenon, however, makes the behavior of AI algorithms
much harder to predict, which is adverse to their safety.
Technically, one could embed all operations that the AI performs explicitly
into the discrete part of a hybrid program. In practice, however, a rendition of the
safety-critical data and code then quickly reaches completely infeasible sizes. Due
to its use of Markov Decision Process policy optimization, an explicit rendition of
the Next-generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System ACAS X [Kochenderfer
et al., 2012], for example, would have led to a hybrid program with about half a
trillion cases. That is why ACAS X was verified in KeYmaera X by splitting off
the policy comparison from a general symbolic verification [Jeannin et al., 2017].
More generally, AI and machine learning can be understood as unverified
implementations whose compliance with provably safe operations of the CPS can
be ensured using ModelPlex [Mitsch and Platzer, 2016b]. While its primary intent
is to provide ways of bridging safety of models to safety of implementations,
ModelPlex does not actually mind for what reasons part of the CPS are unverified,
including for complexity reasons or due to the use of AI and learning in the CPS.
Sandboxed Execution of a Learned CPS. Combining reinforcement learning with
ModelPlex safety monitors enables provably safe reinforcement learning in CPS
[Fulton and Platzer, 2018]. Reinforcement learning repeatedly chooses actions and
observes outcomes in the (simulated or real) environment and makes those ac-
tions more likely if the outcome was favorable and less likely if it was not [Sut-
ton and Barto, 1998]. The most obvious way of benefiting from a provably safe
ModelPlex monitor in a learning CPS is to leave learning alone while training and
then, during deployment, simply safeguard all actions performed by the trained
CPS using the ModelPlex monitors. The advantage of this approach is that it is
conceptually simple, but the downside is that the experience obtained from the
learning algorithm will be used in a real environment that differs from the train-
ing environment, precisely because the ModelPlex monitors only interfere after
deployment not during training, which may lead to a suboptimal performance.
Sandboxed Learning of a CPS. Another alternative is to integrate reinforcement
learning with ModelPlex safety monitors more deeply and use the feedback from
safety monitors throughout the learning [Fulton and Platzer, 2018]. First of all
will the reinforcement learning algorithm learn to act in the same sandboxed envi-
ronment that it would otherwise be acting in after deployment. Second of all does
that give the learning algorithm a chance to learn the concept of safety and learn
which actions will be vetoed due to ModelPlex monitor violations. Furthermore
can the reinforcement learning algorithm benefit from the early feedback that
the ModelPlex monitors provide, which immediately flag actions as problematic
if they could have unsafe downstream consequences, instead of having to wait for
a scenario where an actual disaster happened later on, and then find out how to
propagate this outcome back to the earlier root cause decision. Such early feed-
back has been observed to significantly speed up convergence of reinforcement
learning. Another advantage of sandboxed learning is that the resulting policy
(when started from a safe initial policy or fallback) can be provably safe [Fulton
and Platzer, 2018]. A downside of sandboxed learning is that the learning may
become overly reliant on the sandbox interference, and that it cannot learn be-
havior outside the known safe sandbox. This can be compensated for by allowing
exploration outside known safe actions (within a simulated training environment).
Recovery Learning of a CPS. Yet another possibility for combining formal meth-
ods with machine learning is to continue to use information from safety proofs
even outside known safe parts of the world [Fulton and Platzer, 2018]. In that case
do quantitative versions of ModelPlex monitors serve as reward signals that tend
to pull the system back from unsafe into safe space. Beyond the experimental ob-
servation that this enables a safe recovery outside well-modeled parts of the world
is it possible to give rigorous safety proofs of the resulting behavior of the learning
CPS for the case of multiple possible models that are not all wrong or that can
be modified to safely fit reality with verification-preserving model updates [Ful-
ton and Platzer, 2019]. The basic idea is to use the conjunction of all ModelPlex
monitors of plausible models to determine which action is safe while discarding
models whose predictions did not end up happening. Satisfying assignments to
logical combinations of ModelPlex monitors of different models can be used to
actively plan differentiating experiments and converge a.s. to the true model.
Of course, all three of these types of modifications of learning algorithms or
deployments of learned systems could be used with any other monitor, but then
the crucial ingredient of provable safety of the outcome would be missing.
There is no point in using any learning to find out how to act in the bouncing
ball model from Example 3, because its discrete part is a deterministic if-then-else
statement allowing no room for any actual decisions. But suppose the ground is
replaced by a ping-pong paddle that can actively hit the ball harder than a passive
floor could. Then, there suddenly is a control choice to be made and it can make
sense to use learning from experience to find out how hard to best hit the ball
under what circumstance. This would require a change in the model replacing the
fixed damping coefficient c by a variable pushback from the ground as a function
of how quickly the ping-pong paddle swings.
8. Conclusion
While short and succinct out of necessity, the purpose of this article was to survey
the Logical Foundations of Cyber-Physical Systems approach, which is detailed
in a recent textbook of the same name [Platzer, 2018a]. This approach provides a
solid foundation for the analysis and correct development of cyber-physical sys-
tems and their quite subtle controllers. The KeYmaera X theorem prover pro-
vides automatic and interactive and programmable ways for rigorously proving
the safety (or other properties) of hybrid systems in differential dynamic logic.
Extensions were summarized that transfer safe models to a safe reality, provide
provably safe execution on CPS, or augment safe CPS with safe learning to ob-
tain the best of both worlds. Extensions from hybrid systems to hybrid games
are also implemented in the theorem prover KeYmaera X, but presented along
with their generalizations elsewhere [Platzer, 2015,Platzer, 2017b,Platzer, 2018a].
Extensions from hybrid systems to distributed hybrid systems [Platzer, 2012a]
are fascinating and useful, but presently only implemented in previous-generation
theorem provers [Platzer and Quesel, 2008,Renshaw et al., 2011].
Acknowledgements. I thank Brandon Bohrer for his feedback on this overview.
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